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Visions and Numbers: Aronofskys rr
and the Primordial Signifier
PAUL EISENSTEIN

~

Rrhaps the revolutionary proposition of Lacanian psychoanalysis involves the notion that analytic discovery does not involve a
finding of meaning. In lieu of such a finding, the end of Lacanian
psychoanalysis entails instead an encounter with something that signifies whose most salient feature is its stupidity-that is, its inability
to be inscribed in any meaningful way within the order of understanding and knowledge. Lacan calls this thing that signifies a pure
or primordial signifier, and he insists that both the efficacy of psychoanalytic treatment and our very conceptualization of the structure of subjectivity is bound up ineluctably with it. Admittedly,
Lacan's advocacy of the primordial signifier cuts against the contemporary belief that freedom, pleasure, and radical politics depend
on our liberation from such signifiers (and in many cases from
subjectivity itselD. For Lacan, however, there is no getting beyond
the primordial signifier, not when we recognize its structural necessity. Indeed, as Lacan sees it, the primordial signifier has simply a function-a formal gesture to carry out whose importance
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lies not in the content of its signification, but rather in the fact that
it is signifying. In a parable of sorts meant to illustrate this essential dimension of the signifier, Lacan says:
I'm at sea, the captain of a small ship. I see things moving about
in the night, in a way that gives me to think that there may be
a sign there. How shall I react? If I'm not yet a human being, I
shall react with all sorts of displays, as they say-modeled,
motor, and emotional. I satisfy all the descriptions of psychologists, I understand something .. .. If on the other hand I am a
human being, I write in my log book-At such and such a time,
at such a degree of latitude and longitude, we noticed this and that.
[1993, p. 188, Lacan's emphasis]

This trivialization of just what a primordial signifier ends up
moving a human being to write down-the message it brings reduced to a mere "this and that"-is part and parcel of a strategy to
drain it of any and all meaning (thus meeting directly the charge
that psychoanalysis belongs to the logocentric, and therefore dubious, history of reason and rationality) . 1 Indeed, what distinguishes the primordial signifier for Lacan is precisely the extent to
which it calls attention to its autoreferential, purely formal aspect.
As Lacan puts it,
What distinguishes the signifier is here. I make a note of the
sign as such. It's the acknowledgement of a receipt (!'accuse de
reception] that is essential to communication insofar as it is not

1. This very notion of a pure signifier-of a signifier immune to perpetual
partition-continues to mark the impasse between deconstruction and psychoanalysis. In his most recent critique of the latter, Derrida again brings to bear on
psychoanalysis "the question of divisibility," a question that renders impossible
any putative claim to have unearthed a primordial signifier and thus reached a
terminus of analysis: "Because dissociability is always possible (and with it the
undoing of the social bond, dissociability) , because one must always and can
always analyze, divide, differentiate further, because the philolytic principle of
analysis is invincible, one cannot assemble anything whatsoever in its indivisibility" (1998, p. 33) .
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significant, but signifying. If you don't articulate this distinction clearly, you will keep falling back upon meanings that can
only mask from you the original mainspring of the signifier
insofar as it carries out its true function. [1993, p. 188]

Here, Lacan points to the radical and unsettling dimension of the
primordial signifier: we know we are in its presence when we are
forced simply to take note of a sign as such, when we choose to
acknowledge receipt of a "message" that signifies wjthout being
significant. 2
As Lacan's parable suggests, it is a primordial instance of signifying that enables a properly human world to emerge. This is why
it makes sense to speak of the primordial signifier's function as
essentially "creationist." As the first and purely formal instance of
communication, it calls a human individual out of the animal world
of automatic reactions and institutes a world in which objects and
the natural environment achieve consistency and speech becomes
possible. The psychoanalytic account of human and cultural development lies here-in the notion that a sign acknowledged but
not understood is the only way to account for the passage from nature

2. The quintessential exemplar of such a message is, for Lacan, the statue
of a smiling angel. According to Lacan, we need only visit a few cathedrals in
order to see that an angel's smile is stupid-a sign that "it is up to its ears in the
supreme signifier" (1998 , p. 20). For this reason, angels underscore the function
of the signifier. As La can puts it, "It's not that I believe in angels ... it's just that
I don't believe they bear the slightest message and it is in that respect that they
are truly signifying" (pp. 20-21). This same point can be seen in Adorno's championing of modernist art over and against social realism, his belief in the radical
potential inherent in the autonomous work of art. Does not Adorno's aesthetic
theory rest likewise on situating the work of art at the level at which its form
alone isolates the primordial, alienating signifier oflate capitalist social relationsthat is, on the essential abandonment of a work of art dedicated to the communication of a message or lesson? As Adorno puts it, "The very idea, so fashionable nowadays, of 'stating something' is irrelevant to art" (1977, p . 168). Nor is
"the office of art to spotlight alternatives" (p. 180). Instead, in Adorno's memorable phrase, the work of art resists the course of the world (i.e. , the extant social
order) by its form alone, rejecting in the process what Adorno called "the dogmatic sclerosis of content" (p. 154).
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to culture, from the animal world of instinct and appetite to the
human world of language and desire. This sign acknowledged but
not understood (i.e., the signifier) literally effects the subject-that
is, it brings a subject about out of nothing. We are, as Lacan suggests, "not yet a human being" when every signifier is understood
to bear a meaningful and intelligible message.3 Indeed, when every desire is automatically and directly materialized, we cannot yet
even be said to reside in the order of desire proper. But when one
signifier exempts itself from the order of meaning, when the message it brings eludes understanding, when we are forced to take
note of its strictly formal function, then a fundamental division
between self and Other can be said to have taken place, and a social order emerges in which we begin to speak and signify. Lacan's
central thesis regarding the advent of subjectivity and the social
order returns again and again to the key role played by the primordial signifier in setting the subject adrift in a world of alterity, a
world in which others appear to want something of us. When Lacan
claims that "the signifier is what brings jouissance to a halt" (1998,
p. 24), this is what he means: functioning as a sign that strikes the
subject as a kind of address, the signifier interrupts the apparent
(but in fact engulfing) idyll of presymbolic enjoyment, inaugurating a subject of desire and crystallizing an ontologically consistent
social reality capable of being apprehended by human beings.
The "this and that" whose observation is enabled by the primordial signifier, then, is perhaps the most sublime of all trivia; as

3. One of the most interesting features of Steven Spielberg's AI. lies in its
depiction of this idea. When David, the young "mecha " child (a mechanical
being with artificial intelligence), is first introduced into a human family, heappears as an inhuman presence, evincing a dispassionate coldness and inability to
interact smoothly with his new mother and father. This coldness stems directly
from his belief that every signifier bears a meaningful message, which is why the
"directions" for adopting him involve confronting him with the stupid dimension of the signifier. His mother effects his humanization by reading a series of
seven stupid, nonsensical signifiers. This encounter with the senseless signifier
thrusts David into the realm of humanity, and he immediately hugs his "mother"
and expresses his love for her.
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the exception that interrupts the circuit of demand and satisfaction, it ends up serving as the basis upon which human beings find
their bearings in the world. We have here, of course, landed on
the centrality of the Oedipus complex (i.e., the phallus qua primordial signifier) in the development and socialization of human sexuality. By introducing the signifier, the Oedipus complex enables
the supersession of polymorphous sexuality by a hierarchization
of the drives, thus conditioning a relationship between human
beings and their sexed bodies that takes into account the larger
norms and rules governing the display or practice of sexuality (including, most crucially, the prohibition of incest). But the pure or
primordial signifier emerges just as crucially in other forms-for
instance, in the most primitive of cave paintings and mythological
stories and in the highest natural laws unearthed by modern physics. Because both furnish signifiers without the slightest literal
meaning, they provide the basic rules and laws that set us upright
in the world, lending an organization and a structure and an order
to human reality-or, as Lacan's encomium for Einstein's "little
equations" would have it, "thanks to him we hold the world in the
palm of our hand" (1993, p. 184).
Lacan's claims regarding the stupidity of the signifier bear
directly on what is arguably the dominant symptom of our historical moment-the psychotic structure (and threat of full-blown
psychosis) currently animating a number of contemporary scientific and mathematical efforts to "discover" that the primordial
signifiers that stitch up a given universe of meaning do in fact carry
a message of intelligible and meaningful content. Underwritten by
the belief that these signifiers were never bereft of literal meaning
in the first place, these efforts work at "incorporating the exception"-at certifying once and for all the tumescence of the signifier. Examples of these efforts are numerous. There is, for example,
the so-called Bible Code, in which events as disparate as Newton's
discovery of gravity, the Stock Market's 1929 collapse, and Yitzhak
Rabin's assassination are foretold by the God of the Old Testament.
There is the Suzy Smith Project at the University of Arizona, in
which subjects algorithmically encrypt a short phrase or sentence
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that they'll then attempt to communicate to a living person after
they die (thus confirming the survival of consciousness in the hereafter) . And finally, there is The Second Coming Project in Berkeley,
California, which aims to locate an "incorrupt cell from one of the
many Holy Relics of jesus' blood and body" for the purpose of fertilizing a human egg with Christ's DNA and then implanting the
zygote "into the womb of a young virginal woman (who has volunteered of her own accord), who will then bring the baby jesus
to term in a second Virgin Birth. "4 In all of these quests, we seem
to be in the midst of concerted, psychotic attempts to show that
our symbolic order has in fact been carrying the traces of its canonized status all along, that its ground is a sacred, extratemporal
order of meaningful knowledge that has simply been awaiting the
technological progress necessary for its discovery. 5 It is this order
of knowledge, then, that stands ready to rebeatify our world and
thus reverse the effects of that traumatic cut that marks the institution of the signifier-what Lacan, in the aforementioned parable,
refers to as "things moving about in the night that gives me to think
that there may be a sign there."
The hidden but crucial mediator of these efforts is the critical, said-to-be "objective" or "ideal" signifying capacities believed
to inhere in the means by which science and math register and transmit information. The miracle of these capacities, for their adher-

4. For more on these three phenomena, see, respectively, Drosnin (1997,
2002) , Smith (2000), and The Second Coming Project.
5. This view finds its clearest expression in Drosnin's 1997 bestseller, The
Bible Code, in which Drosnin-a skeptic won over to the idea that the Old Testament foretells significant events in human history-claims that we can certify
the truth of the Bible Code today only because we have the technological means
to do so. As Drosnin puts it, "The Bible is not only a book-it is also a computer
program. It was first chiseled in stone and handwritten on a parchment scroll,
finally printed as a book, waiting for us to catch up with it by inventing a computer. Now it can be read as it was always intended to be read" (1997, p. 25) . We
see it also in the discourse of The Second Coming Project, which claims that certain key events and lines in the New Testament-e.g. , the Last Supper, "In him
we have redemption through his blood" (Ephesians 1:7)-have awaited the discovery of cloning for their true meaning to be apprehended.
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ents, rests precisely in the presumption that the ultimately meaningful natural and/or theological truths and causes they discover
remain uncontaminated by the means used to procure and communicate them. This is not just to repeat the maxim that every
observer changes, in however small a way, what he/she observes;
it is to say, instead, that structurally speaking, there is necessarily
a non-sensical dimension-a point of opacity-in the Thing observed that permits our observation of it in the first place. In other
words, something about the Thing is not, and cart'not< be, entirely
obvious. That so many recent scientific and mathematical attempts
to break through and discover the very secrets of extratemporal
knowledge rely explicitly on code is thus not surprising. As a metalanguage more accurate than our own, codes come to stand as a
form of transcendent and meaningful writing written by the Other
and existing independently of human cognition. That is to say,
codes appear as a kind of metalanguage immune to the conditions
or limitations that make a discourse possible. 6 Today, DNA is increasingly regarded as a kind of code containing the truth of our
being-the very secret of lifeJ And computer codes are routinely

6. These conditions, as I have been saying, involve the extent to which
symbolization already entails the flight or cancellation of the real. One categorical imperative of psychoanalysis is thus to insist that no discourse can claim to
have intelligibly rendered or captured the real. As Bruce Fink puts it, "Psychoanalysis' claim to fame does not reside in providing an archimedean point outside of discourse , but simply in elucidating the structure of discourse itself' (1995a,
p. 137).
7. For the genealogy of this phenomenon, see Kay (2000). Kay's (Foucauldian) historicization of the rise of the genomic code-it is, she claims, a "'period
piece,' a manifestation of the emergence of the information age" (p. 2)-captures
beautifully the extent to which discoveries pertaining to the "elementary unit of
life" become enmeshed in biological meaning-making efforts. From Kay's account,
it is possible to see a kind of "stupidity" in molecular biology's construal of genes
prior to the 1950s. Then, genes were seen simply as proteins bearing biochemical specificities. Prior to the '50s, when the idea of codes or information was invoked, it was almost exclusively as a metaphor, the words themselves appearing
in quotation marks. But as molecular biology gets overrun by "the technoscientific
imaginaries of the missile age," the discourse of information transforms the notion
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credited for uncovering-at long last-meaningful signification in
the real: only a computer, for instance, is capable of turning the
original Bible into one continuous letter strand (304 ,805 letters
long) in order to map every conceivable sequence of letters, and
only a computer is able to encipher phrases into mathematical codes
that can later be deciphered to confirm that a given communication received from the dead is in fact authentic and not one more
instance of the deception that announces the symbolic order's
imperfection. Indeed, today, codes appear more and more to solidify the triumph (initiated by Bacon) of the truth claims of science over those of theology-that is, its ability to explain transcendence in material terms and thus absorb all metaphysical accounts
of causality by referring them to the structural rigor of the scientific method.8
of genes qua proteins into the notion of genes qua information, language, code,
message, and text. The quotation marks disappear and the genomic code becomes
itself an ontology, a veritable Book of Life whose unambiguous reading has awaited
the material and theoretical tools of molecular biology. The problem with such
an unambiguous reading is nothing less than the conceptual ground it clears for
eugenics. If Kay's initial aim is to restore the fundamentally metaphorical nature
of the genomic code-"The genetic code is not a code; it is, rather, a powerful
metaphor for the correlations between nucleic and amino acids" (2000, p . l l ) she does evince the characteristic poststructuralist unease with metaphor in toto .
Thus her suggestion that those who attempt to use information theory in molecular biology in its intended form-to see, for example, the genomic code as a
primordial signifier bearing information that must not be confused with meaning-themselves introduce a totalizing discourse that risks arresting the polysemic
nature of any putative "universal" or "absolute" instance of writing. For a similar genealogical critique of the way scientific explanations are the product of a
given epistemological culture-that is, the way that explanations get to count as
explanations only if they meet certain needs-see Keller (2002).
8. Perhaps the paradigmatic instance of this involves recent neuroscientific
research that explains religious experience-what Michael Persinger calls "the
God Experience"-in terms of the evolution of neural networks, neurotransmitters, and brain chemistry. Relying on the most advanced brain-imaging technology, this research focuses on "brain function" during meditation, prayer, and ritual
experiences in order to understand more completely the feeling of having communed with a transcendent Being. For this thesis, see Persinger (1987) and
Newberg and D'Aquili (1998) . The unstated assumption informing efforts such
as these is that no phenomenon can ultimately escape the order of scientific laws.

At one level, the assertion of such codes at least has the advantage of arresting the endless play of substitutions characteristic of a more metonymic, deconstructionist universe; at another,
however, they raise the paranoid specter of a language that coincides with-instead of sublating-what it illuminates. Far from
replacing, canceling, or otherwise barring access to the Other in
its lethal, indistinguishable-from-myself, flesh-and-blood dimension, these codes usher us into a seeming paradise of plenitude.
But the coherent image of this imaginary p~r~dise is eJJ.tirely a psychotic fantasy, since it emanates always from a symbolic position
and functions as a way of compensating for the lack and inconsistency that is part and parcel of that position. It is here that we can
see the extent to which today, by failing to exempt primordial
signifiers from our meaning-seeking efforts, we obstruct the
signifier's crucial role in the institution of the symbolic order-that
is, its overwriting of the imaginary, its calling a halt to jouissance.
By failing to permit the exception around which a universe of
meaning is constituted-the metaphorical substitute for the ultimately lethal jouissance of the flesh and blood· Other (Mother,
Nature, God)-we risk losing that critical place for ourselves as
subjects to gain a foothold, a place secured only when a primordial signifier comes to name and neutralize the potentially allengulfing lethal jouissance of the Other. The failure of this "essential metaphor"-the Name-of-the-Father, the natural Law-to take
hold ends up then catalyzing a psychotic structure in which there
is no lack admitted in the Other, in which the Other telegraphs its
intentions not through the dead letter of the Name or formula
but directly to the subject in the form of libidinally invested,
prelapsarian primordial signifiers.

As Fink puts it, "Causality in science is absorbed into what we might call structure-cause leading to effect within an ever more exhaustive set of laws. A cause
as something that seems not to obey laws, remaining inexplicable from the standpoint of scientific knowledge, has become unthinkable-our general tendency
being to think that it will just be a matter of time before science can explain it"
(l995b, p. 64).
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The diagnostidconceptual dividing line between neurosis and
psychosis lies here: if hysterics encounter a signifier whose meaning remains enigmatic, psychotics never really encounter the sig
nifier proper, since every use of signifiers is believed to bear significant information. Indeed, as Lacan points out, what is most
distinctive about the existence of the signifier-the possibility of
it being used not to inform but to lure-is precisely what does not
belong to the psychic economy of the psychotic. For the psychotic,
every exchange of words is informational. Put another way, psychotics fail to observe the Lacanian distinction between a signifier
that signifies without being significant. In short, for the psychotic,
every word is significant; no word merely signifies. Psychoanalysis,
however, stakes our equilibrium on the non-sensical dimension of
the pure signifier. As Lacan puts it, "to extract a natural law is to
extract a meaningless formula. The less it signifies anything, the
happier we are" (1993, p. 184). 9 As a science, psychoanalysis already has as its target the psychotic structure that underwrites the
fundamentally theological fantasy of the natural and social
sciences-the notion that the deepest secrets of nature and society
will, in the end, be shown to have had a meaningful ground all
along.
This fantasy is crystallized in an exemplary way in Darren
Aronofsky's TT (1998) , a film that, in taking its viewer on the path
from scientific pursuit to full-blown psychosis, ends up as a kind
of object lesson in the etiology and symptomatology of psychosis
for late capitalist culture at large. The achievement of Aronofsky's

9. For Lacan, the space for interpretation depends on reducing the significance of the signifier. This is why psychotics face no interpretive problems. Refusing to concede the nonsense in signifiers, psychotics always find more and
more meaning, and thus never really get to the question of subjectivity. Instead ,
psychotics remain wedded to the ego. As Marie-Helene Brousse points out, the
nonsense in signifiers is what "allows you to impoverish the ego. Interpretation
has to be enigmatic, that is, it has to produce less knowledge. By that, Lacan means,
in the analytic setting, knowledge is to be taken as a test for knowledge and not
as an application of knowledge" (1996, p. 126) .
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film, however, does not extend simply to the accuracy of its portrayal of psychosis. This is because TT ends up-in the encounter it
stages between viewer and film involving both a numerical signifier (a 216-digit number believed to contain the key to the thorniest of social and cosmological enigmas) and a visual signifier (the
image of its central character at the instant of performing a kind of
self-lobotomy)-forcing a confrontation with that which cannot
be made to mean. In the visions and numbers around which TT is
structured, in other words, Aronofsky manages to ist>late the primordial signifier in its purely formal dimension. Thus at the end
of Aronofsky's film, what we have discovered is a kind of imagistic
equivalent of the primordial signifier, an antidote of sorts to the
psychosis that the film depicts and the antithesis to the lion's share
of commercial Hollywood films in which the central images are
eventually inscribed within some intelligible and meaningful
framework. 10
The immediate context for Aronofsky's film is no doubt the
historic, four-thousand year quest to fix the exact value of the most

10. As representative of this trend, we might consider here M. Night
Shyamalan, and the way his films are driven primarily by an inexplicable phenomenon, a nonsensical image or phrase, that ends up being rendered intelligible by film's end. The appeal of The Sixth Sense (1999), for example, lies in the
basic mystery confronting child psychologist Malcolm Crowe (Bruce Willis)-a
boy (Cole Sear, played by Haley joel Osment) with the capacity to "see dead
people. " The full meaning of this phrase is not revealed until we learn by the end
that Crowe, himself, is one such dead individual. The narrative of Signs (2002)
shares a similar logic. Arriving at the scene of a fatal car crash involving his wife,
Father Graham Hess (Mel Gibson) is able to hear her final, seemingly nonsensical, words: "Swing away Merrill, swing away. " The accident is responsible for
Hess giving up both his faith and position in the church. At one point, Hess sees
these lines-which refer to the brother-in-law who now lives with him after a
failed professional baseball career-as simply the random firings of some nerve
endings in his wife's brain. The film's climactic scene, however, in which the Hess
family is confronted directly by a menacing alien, grants them a prescient dimension. That scene dismisses the existence of coincidence, of the free-floating signifier that has no anchor in the universe of meaning. In the end, this is what
convinces Hess to become "Father Hess" again.
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famous of irrational numbers (7T) 11-a quest whose current manifestation has mandated the building of ever more elaborate computers capable of calculating the ratio of a circle's circumference
to its diameter out to billions of digits (the current record is 51
billion). This quest to "square the circle" has almost always been a
theological one. What has attracted so many to figuring out the
value of 7T has not simply been the complexity of its endless divisibility but rather why it should unfold in such a complex manner. 12

11. The discovery of irrational numbers-that is, numbers that cannot be
identified completely, since they have no patterns that repeat and thus require
an infinite number of decimals to be written exactly-constitutes one of the decisive paradigm shifts in mathematics away from algebra and toward geometricaVmathematical analysis. It is their discovery that is responsible for dealing the
death blow to the (Pythagorean) notion that "God is number, " that the perfection of God rests in the fact that the relationship between magnitudes could be
represented with integers and their ratios. Irrational numbers give, as it were, a
Kantian turn to the mathematical screw, since they base mathematical analysis
not on the perfect truth and logic of rational numbers (i.e., numbers that are either
"whole" or that can be written with decimals that eventually become zero or that
have a pattern that repeats itself indefinitely) , but on the notion of geometrical
demonstration and a continuum leading to infinity whose terminus cannot be
reached. For an overview of this paradigm shift, see Aczel (2000, pp. ll-24) . Kant,
himself, credits geometry with ushering in a revolution "much more important
than the discovery of the passage around the celebrated Cape ": because geometry recognizes a kind of opacity/irrationality in numbers, it ends up dealing not
with what numbers and the properties of figures are, in themselves, a priori. Instead, what geometry elucidates is that numbers and the properties of figures are
brought out by an act of the subject-that is, "by virtue of what [the mathematician) himself was, according to concepts, thinking into it a priori and exhibiting" (1996, pp. 17-18).
12. For an overview of the history informed by this notion, see Blatner
(1997). Blatner notes that no measurement realistically requires even 100 digits
of pi-engineers routinely use no more than seven and physicists use no more
than fifteen or twenty. For him, the search for pi is "deeply rooted in the human
spirit of exploration-of both our minds and our world-and in our irrepressible drive to test our limits" (p. 3). As Blatner sees it, rr separates the line between the finite and the infinite and thus represents a mystery to be appreciated.
Behind this appreciation, however, appears to be a deferral of the (Hegelian) recognition that every pull up in the face of the infinite is in fact the infinite. The computation and writing of the decimals-Blatner's own book contains one million
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For Max Cohen (Sean Gullette), the brilliant mathematician at the
center of Aronofsky's film, the advances and insights into mathematical knowledge likewise have little to do with utility. As Max
asserts in one of the film's initial voice-overs, mathematics is the
very language of Nature. Everything around us can be represented
and understood through numbers, he claims, and these numbers,
if graphed, will reveal the emergence of meaningful patterns. Max's
voice-over here culminates with his sitting in a park in New York
City's Chinatown, staring at the leaves at the top "fa-tall tree, with
shots from Max's point of view that zoom in on these leaves suggesting a kind of superior, penetrating sight on Max's part. (The
reverse shots likewise zoom in on Max's face, suggesting an uncanny intelligence in Nature itself.) As we might expect, this deepseated belief that nothing in Nature eludes our sense-making capacities has its origins in Max's boyhood, where the institution of
the primordial signifier in the form of a fundamental prohibition
never took hold. This is made clear in the film's initial voice-over
in which Max gives us our lone insight into his childhood: as a boy,
he disregarded his mother's prohibition not to stare at the sun, and
the experience resulted in the temporary bandaging of his eyes, in
recurrent headaches, and in the feeling (as Max puts it) that "something had changed inside me."
Far from functioning as a lesson on the necessity of symbolic
interdictions, this experience is described instead in words Icarus
might have used (the film will later invoke the Daedalus-Icarus
motif)-as a kind of triumphant refusal to accept any effective prohibition. For Max, this refusal amounts to an instance of fortitude
that provides direct access to the deepest sources of the Other's (in
this case, Nature's) secrets, delivering in the process a moment of

of the digits-might be a way to evade an encounter with the symbolic icon IT,
and the fact that it keeps on signifying. From the standpoint of physics, the same
is true for the crucial element hydrogen. As john Rigden suggests in the epilogue
to his "biography of hydrogen," the continued existence of science is linked to
the fact that "the hydrogen atom still beckons," on the fact that there is something about this "essential element" that remains opaque (2002, p. 255).
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pure understanding. 13 Convinced of the existence of patterns everywhere in nature-in disease epidemics, in the wax and wane of
caribou population, in sunspot cycles, in the rise and fall of the
Nile-Max has now centered his attention on the stock market,
believing that it, too, must evince a meaningful pattern capable of
being known. Indeed, this is for him, in some sense, the sole significance of the stock market: just like the movement of the leaves
of a tree, it is an entity that is signifying, and Max is committed to
discovering the "intelligence" behind it.14 For him, the stock market stands not as the exemplary signifier without signified of late

13. This sense of triumph emerges in Max's second voice-over dealing with
the disregarded prohibition: "When I was a little kid, my mother told me not to
stare into the sun. So once, when I was six, I did. At first, the brightness was
overwhelming, but I had seen that before. I kept looking, forcing myself not to
blink. And then the brightness began to dissolve. My pupils shrank to pinholes
and everything came into focus . And for a moment, I understood. "
14. One sign of Max's psychosis here is that he is not at all concerned with
symbolic recognition or material advantage. This is patently clear in his rejection of the Wall Street firm Lancet-Percy (i.e., the "petty materialists"), which
wants access to Euclid's predictive abilities. On the contrary, Max wants perfection-the jouissance of the Other in an unmediated form . Aronofsky extends this
insight into psychosis in his second film, Requiem for a Dream (2001). At first
glance, it might appear that Aronofsky has pursued a different path, since the
thing that catalyzes the plot is his protagonists' attempt to secure the recognition of the Big Other: Sara Goldfarb (Ellen Burstyn) wants to appear on television in her red dress and thus regain the recognition she imagines she once
enjoyed; her son Harry Goldfarb Oared Leto) and his girlfriend Marion Silver (Jennifer Connelly) aim to open up a dress shop; and Harry's friend, Tyrone C. Love
(Marlon Wayans), is shown more than once speaking to a picture of his dead
mother about his pursuit of money and security. But as Requiem dramatizes the
quest to realize the "dream" of societal validation, it ends up showing that the
(horrific) appeal of a pre-symbolic jouissance is too great. This explains the great
pull of the addictions that lead to the ruination of the four (captured , in the film's
climax, by the way Aronofsky depicts a kind of horribly triumphant orality: Sara
has a rubber appliance put into her mouth during her electroshock treatment;
Marion has a dollar bill shoved into her mouth while being forced to "perform"
at the party; Harry's mouth is covered by an oxygen mask) . The end of the film
reveals that the other "dream" in the film-centered on Harry and Marion's love
for each other (at one point, Harry says to Marion that she is his "dream")-is
likewise no match for the lethal jouissance of the Other.
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capitalist social relations; on the contrary, he sees it as "a universe
of numbers that represents the global economy. Millions of human
hands at work . .. billions of minds . . . a vast network screaming
with life. An organism. A natural organism." His hypothesis is that
deep within the stock market, "there is a pattern as well. Right in
front of me. Hiding behind the numbers. Always has been." In the
attempt to make plain what has been hidden, Max's life (and entire
apartment) is devoted to Euclid-a monstrous, homemade assemblage of monitors, hard drives, modems, ~nd cables that Max has
retrieved from an electronic mega dump, that exceeds in power and
speed the entire Columbia University computer science department
and that is on the verge of being able to predict with 100 percent
accuracy the daily vicissitudes of the market. At the onset of the film,
Max is "so close" to achieving this accuracy, and he spends his days
working to inoculate Euclid against anomalies he chalks up to
human error, and checking The Wall Street journal against the data
Euclid is able to produce.
At the coffee shop where he compares stock quotes, however,
Max makes the acquaintance of Lenny Meyer (Ben Shenkman), an
orthodox Jew who, upon learning Max's name, reminds him of his
Jewish identity, mentioning Kabbalah and the fact that it is now a
"critical moment" in the history of]udaism. Lenny asks Max if he's
ever put on tefillin-the small cube-shaped boxes worn on the
forehead and arm, containing the four textual sources (from the
Bible) for the practice. Two of these sources come from Exodus
and concern the duty for each Jew to commemorate God's deliverance of the Jews, to acknowledge a God for whom such deliverance begets certain responsibilities and obligations. The other two
come from Deuteronomy and concern Judaism's basic prayer, the
Shema, which begins by acknowledging the singularity of God
("Hear 0 Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is One") and then
proceeds to lay out a detailed description of the rewards and punishments that might follow from obeying (or not) His laws. For
Lenny, tefillin have "a tremendous amount of power" and putting them on is a "mitzvah for allJewish men to do"-a good deed
that "purif[ies] us and bring[s] us close to God. " The tefillin may
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"look strange" (at these very words of Lenny's, Aronofsky cuts to
a close-up of this object), but the place of the small box in daily
Jewish worship is clearly intended to recall the symbolic pact made
between God and the Jews-a pact rooted in filial recognition of
the paternal Law, as well as the several substitute satisfactions God
offers in the form of speech, writing, ritual prayer, and obedience.
Conceptually, tefillin introduce both the conditional freedom that
constitutes the theme of Exodus and the Jews' deliverance from
slavery in Exodus, as well as the injunction to love and follow the
entire codified set of good deeds designed to secure the approval
of God. The practice of putting on tefillin involves the realization
of this conceptual dimension. The knots and straps placed on head
and arm involve, as it were, a symbolic performance of self-binding,
a constraining of one's intellectual and bodily prowess. In this light,
it is not hard to see why the very mention and sight of tefillin constitute the threat to Max that they do. As a reminder of a fundamental obligation, it presents to Max the place of the Law where
there is no signifier, the edge of a hole, and thus triggers in Max
the first of a series of psychotic breaks in which Aronofsky ushers
his viewer entirely into the domain of the imaginary, besieging us
with a rapidly cut chaos of perceptions, sensations, visual images,
and auditory impressions. His thumb twitching, his head invaded
by sounds he can't control, Max returns to his apartment where he
hallucinates the existence of an "Intruder" pounding on his door,
unlocking its several bolts, and finally breaking its chains-at which
point he becomes unmoored from the social world altogether, and
the film's field of representation is entirely taken over by what
Aronofsky has termed "the blinding white void. " 15 One of the
achievements of TT lies here, in its depiction of the paradoxical and
harrowing nature of the fully fledged psychotic break, in which the

15. Strictly speaking, this is the second such breakdown, since the last frame
of the opening credits-not coincidentally, the picture of a whitened sun against
a black background-is engulfed by the blinding white void that dissolves eventually into the opening image of the film : an extreme close-up of Max's face, his
nose bleeding, his cheek to the floor as he comes to.
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subject is completely engulfed by the jouissance of the Other. For
Max, God is not yet an entity one must attempt to satisfy-and
thereby ward off-by the repeated performance of ritual; on the
contrary, He is an entity to be known, a source of perfection that
can help us understand (and thereby gain mastery over) our world.
But as the film clearly demonstrates, the knowledge and perfection
he seeks at the same time threaten the very ontological consistency
of Max's universe, which explains his injunctions (on the cusp of
the break) for the "Intruder" to "leave me alone." Refusing to accede to the act of exchange that marks the very founding of Judaism (and of any symbolic order)-the dividing up and distributing of jouissance-Aronofsky thus depicts Max being made to bear
God's return in the real. And what that return entails is not the
harmonious symbiosis with the Other that the psychotic imagines.
After regaining consciousness, Max symptomatically interprets
his problem as an organic one whose remedy rests with neuroscience and pharmacology. 16 Soon, Euclid accurately predicts a
series of stock quotes-in the process spitting out a 216-digit
number at the very instant that it crashes-and Aronofsky's film
arrives at the primordial signifier whose meaning the psychotic is
desperate to literalizeY The notion that this signifier bears a literal meaning-that there is something to be seen behind or beneath

16. The list of Max's "failed treatments" (given to us in a voice-over) is a
long one: beta-blockers, calcium channel blockers, adrenalin injections, high-dose
ibuprofen, steroids, trager metasitics, violent exercise, Cafergot suppositories,
caffeine, acupuncture, marijuana, Percodan, Midrin, Tenormin, Sansert, homeopathies. He also consults some sort of medical textbook, hoping to localize that
section of the brain that might be responsible for his "headaches. " Needless to
say, all of these measures treat the problem as organidphysiological.
17. It is interesting to note that when Max takes apart his computer to
discover the cause for the crash, he finds the remains of an ant that has left some
sort of ooze on the circuit boards, shorting them out. This ooze cannot be silicon, given silicon's melting point of 1414 degrees Celsius (2577 degrees Fahrenheit)-a feature that makes it so suitable for circuit boards. At any rate, this organic discovery of what in fact interfered with his computer's ability to run
correctly becomes, in Max's hands, a profound source of inspiration. In this scene,
and the one following it, I think we can see Aronofsky playing off the motif at
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the number-is only enhanced by Max's discoveries following
Euclid's crash: first, that his mentor Sol Robeson's (Mark Margolis)
investigations into the number TT crashed into a 216-digit number
as well and second, that Lenny Meyer's group of Hasidic Jews (led
by Rav Cohen [Stephen Pearlman]) believes the same number to
be the true name of God whose intonation would reverse the Roman
destruction of the Second Temple and thus restore the High Priests
of]udaism (the Kohanim) to their place at the center of that Temple
and, ultimately, return the world to the Garden of Eden. 18
In the case of the latter, we see perhaps most explicitly the
extent to which the vivification of God is linked to the meaning
believed to reside in the father's name. Citing the Talmud, Rav
Cohen instructs Max that the entire priesthood, all of the Kohanim
(the Cohens), were destroyed by the Romans at the destruction of
the Second Temple. In this way, their "greatest secret" was destroyed, and along with it, any real ground capable of guaranteeing the integrity of their name. Bereft of the Temple, there is no
longer a place for the crucial "single ritual" that the holiest of
priests-the "High Cohen"-must perform. According to Rav Cohen,
on the Day of Atonement, all of Israel would descend upon Jerusalem to witness this priest's trip into the "earthly residence of God"
at the center of the great Temple for the purpose of intoning His
true name. If the priest was pure, he would emerge a few moments
later and Israel's security and prosperity would be secured for the
coming year. In this account of Rav Cohen's, we have here not just
an effort to bring Max back within the fold of Judaism-to make
him a "Cohen"-but all the ingredients for the formation of a group

the heart of the story of Archimedes, a figure whom Max's mentor, Sol, actually
invokes later in the film . I thank Edward Fowble for helping me to read these
scenes of the film.
18. Each letter in the Hebrew alphabet carries a numerical value, a fact that
has led some to impute a superior intelligence to this particular language alone.
We see this in Lenny's initial attempts to interest Max in the Torah and Kabbalah,
showing him, for example, how the numerical value of the Hebrew word for
mother (41) added to the numerical value of the Hebrew word for father (3) is
equal to the numerical value of the Hebrew word for child (44) .
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of believers: a group ratifies its privileged plate in God's gaze
through a ritualized performance rooted in an utterance permitted to only one man in one restricted space. It is perhaps here that
the trauma of the destruction of the Temple comes through most
clearly, that a direct line from that destruction to our contemporary psychotic universe emerges. Indeed, might we see the circumscribed space of the Temple not merely as a sign of its holiness,
but rather as the place that veils the stupidity of the signifier, as
the place where a purely formal , performative, "magical" selflegitimizing gesture takes place? The trauma of the <iestruction of
the Temple, then, resides not in the loss of the true name of God,
but rather in the Wizard of Oz-like drawing back of the curtain on
those founding signifiers that gain their force purely from their own
enunciation. Bereft of this space, Rav Cohen cannot position himself as a symbolic father, electing instead to take up the role of
Urvater and hoping Max is interested in protection from God's
jouissance. But as Paul Verhaeghe has observed, in the wake of the
loss of symbolic paternal authority, "primal fathers are popping up
everywhere, on the lookout for their ownjouissance" (2000, p. 139).
We might see Max, himself, as such a father. This would explain
why he will not for an instant entertain the possibility of letting a
Cohen "higher" than himself intone the word.
Aronofsky has already prepared us, however, for the fact that
an intoning of the word is likely neither to recover a foundation
that is beyond or beneath its own utterance, nor to become the
meaningful basis for group identity. As Max's psychotic breaks have
already made plain, there is only a kind of nothingness-a blinding white void-beyond or beneath the primordial signifier. And
though the parties seeking possession of the 216-digit number
imagine it as a conduit for stability and understanding and an exalted sense of community, Aronofsky's film stages precisely the
opposite outcome. This is its central importance as a film;· rather
than consent to the "lie" that cements a given social order-the
belief that Max is, in fact, a "high priest" of sorts, the bearer of
knowledge that they want to know nothing about-the parties
seeking possession of the number evince themselves the symptoms
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of their investment in a psychotic fantasy. Thus, the meaning of
the number becomes necessarily an exclusive one. Max believes, for
instance, that God has chosen to place the number in his head alone;
Marcy Dawson of the Wall Street firm Lancet-Percy believes that
the number is fair game for them because information is ipso facto
the language of capital and competition the law of nature; and Rav
Cohen claims that Max is merely the "vessel" for a delivery meant
for them. It is no accident that all three parties act violently toward
each other. Here, Aronofsky gets at the implicit psychotic link
between capitalist competition and religious fundamentalism: both
seek the secret they imagine would secure their supremacy, even
as Marcy Dawson speaks of the "symbiotic relationship" her firm
is trying to forge with Max, and Rav Cohen instructs Max in the
link between the number and an impending Messianic Age.
This link is made formally explicit both in the ways we are
made to see the cube-shaped Ming Mecca chip provided to Max by
Lancet-Percy as well as the way it functions as an object in the film.
This not-yet-declassified chip is introduced as the key to Euclid's
recovery and triumph, and Aronofsky situates and shoots it in such
a way as to make its parallel to a tefillin box unmistakable. We first
see the Ming Mecca chip in a closeup that mirrors the closeup of
the tefillin Lenny first showed Max, and as with the tefillin, the
sight of the chip triggers somatic reactions (e.g., thumb twitches)
that betoken another invasion into Max's head by an Intruder. The
second time we see the chip comes in a medium shot of Max installing it into his mainframe-a shot that frames Max's installation as a kind of monstrous parody of the act of putting the tefillin
around his head. Finally, when Max does get the chip installed, it
triggers a "meltdown" in which Max's rapid circling of the camera
recalls the earlier circling shot to which Aronofsky cuts when Lenny
does get Max to put on tefillin and the two of them begin to recite
the Shema; both evoke an anxious and frenetic encircling of the
void.
But the accuracy of rr's depiction of rampant cultural psychosis is part of a more generalized portrait of the way individuals
encounter alterity in a society bereft of the primordial signifier,
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where there is nothing to shield us from constantly being enjoyed
by others. Almost all of the (little o) others Max encounters in the
film are seen as adversarial, invasive, and violent-the bearers of a
menacingjouissance. Aronofsky captures this cinematically in several ways. First, he films Max in public spaces in ways that make
what Max sees almost always threatening-capable of being looked
at in only the quickest of glances. In these spaces, a hideous sense
of enjoyment seems to pervade even the most ordinary of gestures
(e.g., a man eating a sandwich on a street corner, a man reading
the newspaper on the subway, etc.). Even ·Max's M.llucinations
betoken an overproximate Other whose exclusive gaze he cannot
escape (e.g., the elderly man Max "sees" in the subway who breaks
out into song: "Are the stars out tonight?/ I don't know if they're
cloudy or bright/ For I only have eyes for you, dear"). It is precisely this Other whose most notable feature is its overproximity
that demands a kind of speed and vigilance on Max's part whenever he is in these spaces (e.g., in the subway, in the bodega, walking on the streets of Chinatown, etc.) .19 To capture this speedand accompanying sense of disorientation-Aronofsky almost always
reduces the frame rate in Max's point-of-view shots, thus revealing
the increasingly hyperaccelerated world that Max imagines outside the confines of his or Sol's apartment. In addition, he often shoots
the reverse tracking shots of Max with a Snorricam, a camera attached
to Max's body that results in the frame's tilting with each frenetic
step Max takes. A lens of shorter focal length also works to distort
both Max's face and the spatial relationships between him and the
urban world. Besides reflecting the overproximity of the Other, which
is a distinguishing feature of the psychotic universe, these moves
work, at times, to "imaginarize" the theater itself-that is, to threaten
the implicit contract that governs the theatergoing experience. That

19. The lone exception is the place depicted as outside the circuits of capital and hypertechnologization-Coney Island. There, Aronofsky increases the
frame rate to slow down Max's experience of the world, and includes the sight of
"King Neptune," a man dressed almost like a clown, trolling the beach with a
metal detector, who puts back the seashell he has picked up and admired.
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is to say, besides merely depicting the chaos of Max's world, the
instability of the camera and inconsistency of the frame risk bringing us face to face with that side of the imaginary that borders on
the real. It is this side of the imaginary-and not the one that borders on the symbolic, which reduces the imaginary entirely to the
domain of specular images of wholeness-that marks the latter
imaginary's point of failure, the point at which it breaks into pieces.
Thus we might clarify the Lacanian dimension of the counterideological thrust of Aronofsky's film by saying that rather than
eschew the imaginary altogether as ipso facto ideological, 1Tattempts
to break its privileged link to the symbolic so as to illuminate the
terror of its real, presymbolic status. In other words, the imaginary
depicted in 1T is not the version of it with which we are usually
presented-that is, a realistic presentation of reality that produces
a subject/spectator completely in control of what he/she is seeing. 20
Rather than realistic, coherent mirror images offered up for our
easy identification, rather than a fantasized compatibility between
jouissance and symbolization, Aronofsky gives us instead images
of jouissance that overwhelm the coherence of the film. In so doing,
Aronofsky's film helps us to glimpse the imaginary bereft of the
fantasy frame that makes it seem so appealing, even if this means
bringing Max's world too close to us and making the film, in places,
difficult to endure.
This sense of suffocating overproximity is rendered cinematically in two other significant ways. The first centers around the

20. This is, as the editors point out in their introduction to this volume,
the way Lacanian psychoanalysis has frequently been deployed in film studiesas a way of showing how film's very presentation of reality secures a spectator/
subject in the manner of the mirror stage. In this view, film presents imaginary
scenarios that are always already fantasized versions of the imaginary-that is to
say, versions of the imaginary in which the spectator/subject will precisely not
experience him-/herself in pieces. Thus Stephen Heath's claim that film works
largely by regulating a movement toward disintegration and/or contradiction in
the spectator/subject. According to Heath , "Film is the regulation of that movement, the individual as subject held in a shifting and placing of desire, energy,
contradiction, in a perpetual retotalization of the imaginary" (1981 , p. 53) .
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recurrent hallucination that precedes Max's psychotic breaks involving the sight of a Hasidic jew whose mere presence on the other
side of the subway line Max takes as a threat, and whose hand is
dripping blood, the trail of which leads to Max's own brain. This
image suggests both the extent to which castrating agents appear
to Max in the real, and his investment in a certain neuroscientific
fantasy that likewise literalizes the ur-language of the Other, in
which a certain segment of Max's brain is taken as the locus of
causality for the onslaught of sensory and auditory impressions to
which he is subjected. That Max prods, afid ends up penetrating,
the brain with a fountain pen before being ushered into the blinding white void is perhaps apt, since the jouissance of the Other is
precisely what marks out the limits of discourse. The second involves the way Aronofsky signals the impossibility of any sexual
relationship for Max. This is clearest in the way that for Max, any
woman who evinces the slightest trace of sexual desire betokens
the presence of a maternal being who is at the same time obscenely
and atavistically sexual. His neighbor Devi's attempts to "mother"
Max (she prepares food for him, fixes his hair before he goes out,
worries about his welfare, etc.) are part of her obvious desire for
him; for Max, however, there is no difference between being desired and being enjoyed, no distance that would allow him to exist
before Devi's gaze without being suffocated by her jouissance.
Aronofsky twice has Max on the cusp of arriving at the 216-digit
number at precisely the same instant that Devi and her boyfriend,
Farouk, are engaged in sex. The acoustic dimension of these sexual
encounters sends Max into a virtual panic in which the camera
rapidly circles him. 21

21. Aronofsky has intentionally muffled Devi's sounds here, which only
heightens the sense that he has restaged a primal scene of sorts. After several listens-and thanks to the sound quality of DVD technology-it is possible finally
to discern the sense of Devi's utterances amidst her ecstatic moans: "Do you want
to suck on Mama's nipple? I Oh, those tears are so hard./ Mama's going to make
everything all right."
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That a closeup of Max's finger on the "Return" button of his computer-poised to trigger the computer's revealing of the 216-digit
number-generally accompanies the onset of the all-engulfing
sounds of enjoyment signals the extent to which the primordial
signifier might function for Max. Rather than allowing it to provide some respite from enjoyment, Max, as we have already seen,
insists on trying to discover why the number enjoys in the way that
it does. An articulation of the perils of this attempt to render the
signifier back up into the order of understandable causality is left
both to Euclid and to Sol. Euclid's own demise contains a message
Max can't heed. Becoming aware of its own structure, Euclid must
emit a kind of protoplasmic "little piece of the real," the gooey lifesubstance of an ant that is made to stand in for Euclid's own unsymbolizable origins. This is precisely Sol's lesson to Max. In the face
of the psychotic's certainty regarding the meaningful intelligence
of the Other's jouissance-Max's belief that "there is an answer in
that number"-Sol keeps insisting that the truth of our universe is
that there is no meaningful pattern prior to the institution of a
symbolic network of meanings in which a universe appears. For
Sol, the only pattern is the self-referential one we impose on it,
which is why he refuses to allow the number to signify anything,
contending variously that the number is a "dead-end," a "door in
front of a cliff," a "bug"-all astute ways of characterizing the function of the paternal metaphor in the formation of the symbolic
order. Here, Sol is closest to the psychoanalytic recognition that
the signifier does exist in nature and that it enables us to gain our
bearings on the world, but what it signifies is entirely another
matter. Playing Daedalus to his "renegade pupil" Icarus, Sol tries
to reassert a prohibition, warning Max of the dangers of numerology and urging him to leave the digit "unknown."
The precise function of this advice is left ambiguous in
Aronofsky's film , since there is evidence that Sol's death-from a
second stroke-follows on the heels of a failure to heed his own
advice. At the death scene, Max finds the number written out in
Sol's handwriting on a sheet of paper, and this may just signal the
extent to which Sol's voiced prohibition functioned covertly as a
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way of keeping alive whatever meaning the 216-digit number might
bear. In any case, Aronofsky finally leaves it to Max to grasp the
stupidity of the number and thus to realize the impossible object
at the heart of the psychotic structure. Up until Sol's death, Max
has been committed to "seeing the number," claiming that the
number itself is nothing, that it is what's "between the numbers"
that is important. Back in his apartment after learning of his
mentor's death, Max begins to intone the number (the true name
of God) and is cast again into the blinding white "VOid.. This time,
however, his own image appears in the void, and there is a sense
that he has begun to hear the other speaking within himself as the
bearer of the primordial signifier. This leads directly to the film's
final two images-the first of Max, with a drill in his hand on the
verge of committing a kind of self-lobotomy; the second of Max,
in the park enjoying the factum brutum of Nature, no longer positioning himself as the bearer of a question to which he must have
the answer. At first glance, the first of these images in which we
see the drill penetrate Max's skull, splattering the frame with blood
before cutting to black, would seem to invite a reading of 7Tin keeping with the prevailing neuroscientific control of psychiatry. On
this reading, Max's cure appears to be simple: it is not enough that
he burns the number, since it remains in his head. Thus, what's
called for is an identification and localization of the area of the brain
responsible for the ideational content associated with the number,
the excision of which lets him achieve a degree of equilibrium. But
that this could actually work as a self-administered procedure
strains credulity. Also , since Max appears in the final scene with a
black ski hat covering his head, the status of his scalp/brain is left
purposely veiled.
Perhaps the surest sign that things are far more complicated
than the materialist-realist explanation is the question Aronofsky
has admitted is the one he is most frequently asked: How was the
self-lobotomy sequence filmed? In the light of this question, we
might say here that this image ends up functioning as the film's
own primordial signifier-a vision homologous with the number
at the heart of the film and likewise incapable of being made mean-
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..
ingful. That Aronofsky has confessed that this was the image around
which he structured the film-that "writing movies is like reverse
paranoia"-only furthers the sense that TT leads us to the recognition of the purely signifying function of primordial signifiers. 22 Rather
than make this image signify something meaningful, Aronofsky
appears to grant it a purely structural function. As such, the image
functions to "call a halt to jouissance" and, at the same time, to
remain a site of non-knowledge that is our bulwark against a fully
fledged psychotic universe. The sequence that presents us with the
image of Max Cohen with a drill at his skull, then, consists of a
physical gesture whose stupidity depends on Max's (and our) subjectivization. In the scene that follows, this formal instance of signification has itself become the content. The scene begins with
an extreme closeup of the leaves on the tree of the city park in which
Max is sitting, followed by a reverse medium shot of Max staring
at the tree. Max is then approached by Jenna (the little girl who
lives in a neighboring apartment) to calculate in his head the sum
of two hundred and fifty-five multiplied by one hundred and eightythree. For a moment, Max tries to perform the calculation, then
stops and begins smiling, allowing the little girl to do it on her
calculator. This decision in favor of non-knowledge is captured
cinematically as well in the frames with which the film closesreverse zoom point-of-view shots that complete the arc established
in the film's opening in which Max gains some much-needed distance from Nature. Shot at the normal frame rate, Max gazes at
leaves blowing in the wind in a way that no longer regards them as
the bearer of a hidden and/or sinister pattern or meaning.
The final import of TT here would seem to be that we, too , in
the attempt to counter rampant psychosis, must cast our lot as well

22. In his earliest diary entry related to rr, Aronofsky writes of the lone script
of his that would be suitable for a low-budget film: "The working title is 'Chip in
the Head.' Along with the title I have a single image of Sean Gullette, my actor
friend from college, standing in front of the mirror, his head shaved bald, digging into his skull with an X-Acto blade for an implant he thinks is in there"
(1998, pp. 3-4).

with non-knowledge, with something encountered and perceived
for which we cannot find a meaningful antecedent. This exemplar
of non-knowledge functions to arrest the chain of signification, but
it is something of which we cannot make total sense. Has Max really lobotomized himself by film's end? What does the hat covering
his head really conceal? Is he merely stupid, or has he subjectivized
the stupidity of the primordial signifier at the heart of the film in
which he appears? My own contention is that in these scenes, we
are presented not with the void behind or..beneath language, but
precisely with the signifier as such. In his seminar on ethics, Lacan
claims that "the Thing only presents itself to the extent that it becomes word" and that the word in whose guise it presents itself is
"what remains silent; it is precisely that in response to which no
words are spoken" (1992, p. 55). So, perhaps we need say nothing
about the end of Aronofsky's film except to say that we can say
nothing more. Perhaps the finale of the film enacts itself a kind of
antidote for the psychosis that it has dramatized-an antidote appearing imagistically as the functional equivalent of the Word for
which, today, we must struggle in order to call a halt to jouissance.
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On

the Internet, one can find numerous sites where people can
obtain advice on how to write a love letter. One site, for example,
gives the following instructions:
Clear your desk and your mind of distractions.
Place a picture of the one you love in front of you.
Put on your favorite music.
Take out your best stationery and pen.
On another sheet of paper, make two lists: a) his/her unique
qualities; b) your hopes for the future together.
Personalize the salutation. "Dear---," or "To my darling
---,"are both fine.
In the body of the letter, begin by telling him/her what you think
makes the individual so special. List at least three
qualities, ideally emotional, physical, and spiritual ones.
In the following paragraph, share your hopes and dreams for
the future you can have together.
Personalize the closing. "I will love you always," "Loving you
forever," "My heart is yours," are all good possibilities.

